Two hundred feet above the scorched Nevada desert at 350 knots is unlikely to have been a flight regime envisaged by Avro test pilot Roly Falk when he took the Model 698 on her maiden flight a quarter of a century earlier. And, yet, in the twilight of her Royal Air Force career, crews were operating what was now the Avro Vulcan in exactly such a scenario.

AI patron Gary Fairley takes a look at the legendary V Bomber’s deployments to RED FLAG in the 1970s and early 1980s.

The Avro Vulcan was originally conceived as a high-level strategic bomber, designed to meet the 1947 UK Air Staff Operational Requirement 229 for an aircraft that could deliver a 10,000 lb (4,500 kg) payload to a target some 1,700 miles (3,150km) from its base. Entering service in 1956, the Vulcan provided the backbone of the UK’s strategic nuclear deterrent until the 1962 Nassau Agreement passed the role from the Royal Air Force to the Royal Navy’s Polaris submarine fleet. The role of the Vulcan and the other aircraft which made up the RAF ‘V Bomber’ Force – the Vickers Valiant and the Handley Page Victor – gradually shifted to tactical strike, being declared to SACEUR (NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe) for the Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) role.

Only the Vulcan and Victor would remain in the strike role after fatigue problems were discovered in the Valiant fleet and these hastened the type’s withdrawal from service by 1965.

By 1977, the Victor no longer operated in any attack role, and the 2 remaining operational units (55 and 57 Sqns) provided the RAF’s air-to-air refuelling capability and the Vulcan had already survived an initial plan to see her eased into retirement. While the QRA strike role was now being performed by RAF Laarbruch’s Buccaneer squadrons and the new tri-national Panavia Tornado was being readied in the wings to ultimately replace both aircraft, the Vulcan was still a significant part of the RAF’s conventional attack inventory serving with no fewer than 7 front-line squadrons (Nos 9, 27, 35, 44, 50, 101 and 617 Sqns). When the US Air Force invited the RAF to send crews to participate in its RED FLAG exercise that year, the aircraft was by no means an unusual choice to be sent.

Go West, young man

The Vulcan was no stranger to North American skies with crews regularly undertaking ‘Western Ranger’ trips taking in Goose Bay in Labrador, Canada and Offutt AFB, Nebraska, USA. Vulcans were also regular participants in the USAF Strategic Air Command ‘Big Flight/Giant Voice’ bombing competitions with crews testing their navigation and bombing skills against SAC B-52s. Such was the importance of these deployments that a permanent RAF detachment was established at Offutt and was well used to supporting the big jet on its States-side adventures.

Such was the rapport between the Vulcan force and their hosts that upon its retirement, no fewer than 4 airframes were gifted to museums in the USA and Canada.

RED FLAG was, however, more than a bombing and navigation competition and quite unlike any traditional exercise. Built upon the bitter experiences of combat over North Vietnam, RED FLAG was first held in 1975 and designed to teach attack crews how to fly and survive the critical first 10 missions of any future conflict. Realistic tactical scenarios were for the first time combined with a realistic threat environment simulating the array of Warsaw Pact air and ground defences likely to be faced replaced trophies.

The RAF would be the first overseas air arm to be invited to take part in RED FLAG and Strike Command sent the Vulcan to join Buccaneers from the UK and RAF Germany for the two-week exercise at Nellis Air Force Base, near Las Vegas, Nevada.

While the Buccaneer is perhaps regarded as the superstar of RED FLAG 77-9 and subsequent exercises, the Vulcan’s participation was no less important, particularly in understanding how best to employ the big delta jet in a high-threat environment. However, the aircraft did present some challenges prior to deploying to the bright lights of Nevada.

Stress reduction

Airframe fatigue proved not only to be a deciding factor in which aircraft to send to Nellis, but one that would be a recurring theme throughout the deployment. While the Skybolt air-launched ballistic missile programme had been cancelled, the Vulcan B2 fleet had continued to receive the necessary strengthening to its wings originally in order to carry the weapon. This in turn helped avoid the problems faced by the Valiant fleet at low level but the Vulcan airframes were themselves already two decades old.

Two aircraft and 3 crews from the RAF Scampton wing were initially flown to Nellis in August 1977 to participate in the first week of the exercise and these would be relieved by 2 aircraft and 3 crews from the Waddington wing a fortnight later in order to conserve fatigue life. 

As the exercise got underway, profiles were adapted to limit the low-level element of Vulcan missions and ultimately the aircraft were tasked with Hi-Lo-Hi simulated nuclear strike operations. These required a descent to below 500ft (152m) AGL (above ground level) on approach to the target area followed by a pop-up to high level to release the simulated WE177B retarded tactical nuclear weapon.

Furthermore, the high desert temperatures meant convection turbulence which could cause problems for ageing airframes and to combat this, early morning sorties were favoured for the big V Bomber.

RED STEER versus Red Air

With no defensive armament, the Vulcan was reliant on its suite of electronic countermeasures (ECM) which comprised the ARI 18075 BLUE DIVER, ARI 18076 RED SHRIMP and ARI 18146 jammers located in the bulge in the aircraft’s tail. The ARI 5952 RED STEER and ARI 18228 radar warning receivers were also employed to detect enemy radar and fighter threats.

The exercise exposed deficiencies in the Vulcan’s ECM suite. Serviceability was an issue with ARI 18146 from the outset, mainly down to the Nevada heat, which the aircraft's Vapour Cycle Cooling Pack (VCCP) was ill-equipped to remedy. The RED STEER tail-mounted warning radar suffered from poor performance, particularly at low level. Designed to detect stern-mounted fighter attacks, the maximum range at which it could detect ‘Red Air’ threats during the exercise was an uncomfortably close 2nm (3.7km)! The system was also found to be prone to “breaking through” to the ARI 18228 Passive Warning Receiver. This created false positives on the PWR giving the Vulcans’ Air Electronics Officer the unenviable task of deciphering which threats were real.

The ARI 18146 jammer also suffered from poor performance and this combination of serviceability and performance across the ECM suite meant that the Vulcans “had an almost total inability” to detect stern-mounted attacks. Given the need to address these problems post-exercise, one short-term recommendation was to fit a rear-facing mirror in the cockpit!

Size matters

The Vulcan was also found, perhaps not unexpectedly, to be vulnerable to fighters. While crews were cleared to operate below 500 feet (152m) AGL (subject to a serviceable radar altimeter!), and typically flew at around 300 feet (91m) in the target area, one ‘Aggressor’ F-5 pilot reported acquiring visually one Vulcan at a range of 25nm (46km) thanks to the shadow cast upon the Nellis range desert floor! One response to this threat was to obtain clearance for the more experienced crews to operate down to 200 feet (61m) and the number of claims against Vulcans operating this low. 

The sheer size of the aircraft was always going to be a factor in the visual fight and one aircraft, XM607 was painted with an experimental sand/brown camouflage pattern on its underside instead of the light aircraft grey that normally adorned the Vulcan belly. A similar experiment was conducted by the Buccaneer detachment with some 208 Sqn aircraft painted with a ‘desert’ scheme and, while the colours themselves offered little by way of protection, the darker scheme on the undersides of both types was noted to hinder early acquisition by fighters. While the Buccaneer fleet subsequently adopted a full wraparound camouflage scheme, Vulcans would subsequently carry a mixed economy of both wraparound and light aircraft grey undersides into retirement.

Instead, and in order to avoid shadows and wing flash (as would also be the experience of the Buccaneer crews), Vulcan crews used terrain masking, hiding in the shadows of hillside but remained vulnerable, particularly as the aircraft ‘ballooned’ over ridges and crests. 

While comparatively spritely for an aircraft its size, an attack speed of 350kts did not lend itself to violent evasive manoeuvres and ‘g’ limitations further hindered crews’ ability to disrupt attacks by Red Air fighters. Reviewing Vulcan operations at RED FLAG 77-9, it was also noted that ineffective Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and limited evasive manoeuvring in the Vulcan force Basic Training Requirement (BTR) contributed to the experiences of the crews who took part. It is, however, worth considering the not inconsiderable risks of hauling an aircraft with a 111-foot/34m wingspan around the skies at low-level!

The Vulcan detachment found that the threat environment was perhaps not entirely representative of that which they might face attacking targets in the European. It was noted that the threat corridor was some 20nm (37km) wide compressing a large number of threats into a small space making the intensity of each sortie potentially somewhat unrealistic. While the training value of this particular aspect may have been questioned, the scale of the RED FLAG training area itself did lend itself to more flexibility in mission planning than the current BTR allowed. Vulcan crews were at that time limited to NATO low-level routes only.

All that glitters

In contrast to the public face of the Buccaneer experience, RED FLAG 77-9 could appear to have been a little less euphoric for the V bomber crews. Unlike ‘Giant Voice’, there were no trophies awarded at Nellis, but it was no less rewarding for the crews who flew the sorties. The true value in any exercise is of course in what is learned and while the Vulcan wings highlighted some shortfalls, these were quickly turned into recommendations and improvements, such as:

• Improved fighter evasion tactics for Vulcan crews at low level

• Greater opportunities for operations at 200ft AGL during routine flying

• Use of UK low flying areas (LFAs)

• Improved rear warning equipment

• Revised SOPs to manage crew workload in the target area

From day to night

The RAF returned to Nellis the following year with the Buccaneers accompanied this time by aircraft and crews from the Jaguar force for RED FLAG 79-1 (the numbering reflecting the US fiscal, not calendar, year!). The Vulcan reprised its appearance later that year for RED FLAG 79-2.

Held in November and December 1978, 79-2 was only the second RED FLAG to be held at night. As per the first deployment, 6 crews and 4 aircraft from both Vulcan wings deployed having previously undertaken a week’s low-level night familiarisation at Goose Bay and were supported once again by the Offutt permanent detachment.

By contrast to the 1977 deployment, the nocturnal element of RED FLAG 79-2 saw crews using the Vulcan’s Ferranti terrain following radar (TFR). Compared to the “hands-off” systems used by, say, the Tornado or the F-111, the Vulcan’s TFR was primitive and had been purchased as an add-on rather than being an integral part of the aircraft’s avionics suite. Furthermore, it had been used only sparingly at 77-9 and its reliability/effectiveness even in daytime operations was questionable. 

Nevertheless, work up both in the UK LFAs and at Goose Bay gave crews the experience and – more importantly - confidence of working with the TFR system. The layout of the Vulcan cockpit meant that well-honed crew co-operation was essential (bear in mind that the navigator’s station was not only aft and below the pilots’ but was also facing aft).

Rather than flying at 200-300ft AGL, TFR operations saw the Vulcans operating at what might be considered a more conservative 1000ft. While not necessarily less stressful on the crews (!), this flight regime was also less stressful on the airframes while still being below the altitudes being flown by the host B-52 and FB-111 crews. 

While the lessened Red Air fighter threat was significantly lessened at night, this did make the Vulcan more vulnerable to ground threats. Problems encountered with the Vulcan’s ECM suite during 77-9 appear to have been largely resolved and crews were able to employ fully the aircraft’s defences. Sqn Ldr (later Wg Cdr) ‘Jeff’ Jefford, writing in the flight safety journal, Air Clues in April 1979 quipped that “one suspects that parts of the Nellis ranges are ankle deep in silver foil”!

Practice makes perfect

The Vulcan’s final deployment to RED FLAG took place in January and February 1982. By this time No. 617 Sqn had disbanded and would reform with the Tornado GR1 the following year, while Nos 27 and 35 Sqns would also disband within weeks. 

Nevertheless, 5 crews representing each of the remaining Vulcan squadrons took part in RED FLAG 82-2 which saw them operating once again at night and at low-level, utilising the aircraft’s TFR and defensive systems and building once more upon the experience of the those who had gone to Nellis in the preceding years. 

Little over 3 months later, one of the 88-2 crews - Flt Lt Martin Withers, Fg Off Peter Taylor, Flt Lt Gordon Graham, Flt Lt Bob Wright and Flt Lt Hugh Prior - would be putting it all into practice for real in an even less likely scenario than the Nevada deserts, over the South Atlantic.

Eagles Over Nevada – The RAF at Red Flag is a work in progress by Aircrew Interview Patron, Gary Fairley.  You can follow the project on Facebook at www.facebook.com/redflagbook or drop him a line at redflagbook@gmail.com

Thumbnail photo courtesy of Renaud Pierret